

**CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS**

**STRENGTHENING AMERICA'S SECURITY:  
IDENTIFYING, PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC  
TERRORISM**

**INTRODUCTION:**

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**KEYNOTE:**

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MAJ. GEN. (RET.) PAUL EATON: Well, good morning, everybody. I think you've already had the cell phone lecture from the designated command sergeant major, who's going to turn everything off here.

And I'd also like to point out, while we're sitting, that today is the 14<sup>th</sup> of July; it's Bastille Day. It's the beginning of the French progressive movement. I guess you could say that. Kind of a tough end for the conservative movement in France at that point. We will not do a rousing chorus of La Marseillaise to go through that.

But NSN is proud to cohost this groundbreaking discussion with Center for American Progress Action Fund, "Strengthening America's Security: Identifying, Preventing and Responding to Domestic Terrorism." So specific thanks to the senators, John Podesta and Rudy deLeon, the national security team, the faith and progressive policy team, Think Progress for today's event. It's got a good start. It's a Northwest feel out there, a little bit warmer than what I'm used to. But I'm glad you all made it in.

Local communities are really the best opportunity we've got to help curb the development of domestic terrorism. And we've got a great keynote speaker here today in Congressman Keith Ellison. He understands the problem. He's worked the problem and he's going to tell us what he has learned over time. And sir, I'm very grateful that you were able to make it today.

He is the representative of the 5<sup>th</sup> district of Minnesota – go Vikings – the first Muslim elected to Congress. He is a civil rights attorney. He is on our foreign affairs committee and I can't think of a better opportunity to turn this thing over to you, sir. So, Congressman Ellison? (Applause.)

REP. KEITH ELLISON (D-MN): Good morning, everybody. Come on now, good morning. Let's get the blood flowing a little bit. Good morning. Thank you, Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton for that kind introduction and for your service to our country.

I also want to thank the event sponsors, the Center for American Progress and the National Security Network, for facilitating this event. I'm honored to share the stage with our esteemed panel, which you'll hear from in a moment. And of course, I want to thank each and all of you for attending today.

On November 5, 19 – excuse me, on November 5, 2009, only a few months ago, a friend of mine, a colleague, walked up to me. He's from Texas and he approached me on the House floor during votes. And he told me that an unidentified man had just gunned down a large number of servicepersons at Fort Hood, Texas.

Of course, my thoughts went immediately to the families of the victims. But before I could even absorb the horror of that moment, my colleague added to me and he said, the attacker is believed to be a Muslim and reportedly yelled “Allahu Akbar” as he shot his victims. This friend of mine, with us standing on the House floor, put his hand on my shoulder. He looked directly into my eye and he said, look, you know why I’m telling you this, right?

Of course, he never filled in the blank, but I knew. He never said, I’m telling you this because you could, in some way, be associated with this tragedy because of your religion. He never said, you might be called to respond in the media. He never said, colleagues might want you to explain why someone of your faith would do such a thing.

And he never explicitly said, someone might expect you, specifically you, to make a denunciation of this violence. He never said those things, but he didn’t have to. I got the message and I knew why. And all of you know why. Well, of course, I denounced this thing emphatically, wholeheartedly.

But the reality is, being a Muslim in America today means that friends, colleagues and even detractors, alike, expect a contribution from the Muslim community in the fight against domestic terrorism. And this is a fair expectation. It’s more than fair; it’s right. All Americans, of all faiths, have a duty to protect and defend our country.

And if the Muslim community in the United States has the perspective, knowledge, language, capability or other things to help protect our country, then they can – we must – offer those things. And the organized Muslim community, in fact, has spoken out consistently, emphatically against terrorism and against the individuals and people who promote it. Let me just share a few examples.

Right after 9/11, a coalition of Muslim groups, including the Muslim Political Action Committee, Islamic Society of North America and others declared, we join with all Americans in calling for the swift apprehension and punishment of all perpetrators. They went on to add more. But the Council on Islamic Relations took out a full-page ad on March 9, 2003, stating, “American Muslims condemn all acts of terrorism and are as outraged as our fellow Americans by the atrocities committed in the name of God and our religion.”

American Muslims have condemned terrorism and continue to do so unequivocally. Every major Muslim organization, from the Council on Islamic Relations, Impact, ISNA and many others have clearly and consistently denounced terrorism. In fact, CARE compiled a 68-page document, which can be found on its Web site, of Muslim groups, mosques and other gatherings, from small to large, denouncing murder of innocents in the name of faith, ideology and religion: 68 pages of different groups expressing various points of view.

And Muslims, in fact, have not only denounced terrorism but have denounced the people who promote it, people like Anwar al-Awlaki: born in New Mexico, educated at George Washington University, a few blocks from here, has and must be the target of continued, harsh, swift condemnation.

This individual is articulate and manipulative and he misuses the Quran and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed to justify violence. Recently, he actually called on American Muslims to attack our own country: absurd, ridiculous and must be emphatically condemned. He offers a charismatic, media-savvy pitch that appeals to the rage and instant gratification and gullible, immature and highly alienated individuals.

But his philosophy can and must be defeated. Islamic scholars, in fact, as well as activists, educators and artists are providing point-by-point counternarrative to Awlaki's. Just recently, the Muslim Public Affairs Council issued a public service announcement in which Muslim scholars denounce Awlaki from an Islamic standpoint, stating "Awlaki's statement is deplorable and sickening and has no place in our country or in Islam." That's a statement by Impact leader Salam Marayati, who I believe is here with us today.

Now, taking on Awlaki is vital because he has allegedly inspired the likes of Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, Maj. Nidal Hassan, the Fort Hood killer and allegedly has advised two of the 9/11 killers. He is an influential, persuasive manipulator who is calling for violence against our country. And the Muslim community is standing against him, calling him out. And this is an essential and important thing to do.

Now, of course, Muslims have no corner on terrorism. From the KKK, America's oldest terrorist organization, to the Oklahoma City bomber, to the shooting at the Holocaust Museum by James von Brunn, Americans have witnessed violence by individuals from many different faiths and many different ideologies.

But this is beside the point. The point is that standing in opposition to terrorism is something that Muslim-Americans must do and, in fact, are doing. This is the point. We have an important contribution to make in this struggle and our discussion must lead to practical solutions to make our public safer.

But it's important, as we embark on this conversation and fashion ways and means to protect our community that we make sure that the contribution is available to be made. This implies open doors, outreach and building trust. And I urge a national conversation about domestic terrorism. I welcome domestic and national security conversation because Americans need to be safe.

But also, I urge the conversation because the conversation is going on anyway. And it will proceed with or without the people who cherish individual liberty, diversity and due process of law. People who cherish individual liberty, diversity and due process of law must be involved in this conversation, or else the conversation will go forward without those essential aspects of our national identity as central to the conversation.

We can combat terrorism without demagoguery or the erosion of our civil liberties. For example, in President Obama's Cairo speech, he articulated one of the boldest, most articulate speeches any U.S. president has ever made. And I fully support his vision of equitable partnerships with Muslim-majority countries and the United States.

These include projects like the bilateral science partnerships with Muslim-majority countries – an entrepreneurial summit took place only a few weeks ago – and the appointment of special envoy to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Special Envoy Rashad Hussain, who's with us here today.

But Congress has to get involved in the act too. Congress has to introduce and pass a bill to end racial profiling. And we need to focus on behavior, not worry beads, not beards and not turbans. A key element to undermining terrorist promoters like Anwar Awlaki is the continued integration and inclusion of all Americans, without regard to race, religion, national origin or cultural expression.

But behavior is the best guide, the best guide, as to who represents a security threat to our nation, not race, religion or national origin. We simply shouldn't be arresting people solely because they're praying or wearing turbans or born in a Middle Eastern country. Behavior, not demographic characteristics, should be our guiding light.

Congress should also empanel a commission to study the roots of radicalization. Now, such a proposal was made in the recent past. I supported it, received some criticism from some friends. But I think the real problem is not that we would study the roots of radicalization, but that we don't know nearly enough about it.

We're under the impression that stopping somebody from getting – throwing someone off a plane because they prayed before they got on the plane is a basis for legitimate law enforcement. We're under the mistaken impression that someone's national origin, or whether they wear a beard, or whether they're a devoted follower of their faith, is an indicator of their threat to our nation.

We need to know more about violent radicalization. What turns people towards this? Why? When? Where? Who is susceptible; who's not? And we need to use that information not to violate civil and human rights, but to promote conditions where people feel integrated, a part and trusting of their government.

The U.S. government must be committed for its outreach to the American Muslim community. This outreach includes meetings between senior officials of the civil rights division and of the Justice Department and with representatives of the Muslim, Arab, Sikh, South Asian communities to address civil rights. The Justice Department's Community Relations Service has also been active.

This is a good thing, yet more work needs to be done. I know of too many instances in which law enforcement has fallen back on the lazy resort of racial profiling. Too often, we have seen civil liberties curtailed in the pursuit of combating terror. This approach not only violates our Constitution, but it is not effective law enforcement. It doesn't protect our countrymen and women well enough. Behavior, again, must be our guide.

The government can also benefit from greater cooperation from the Muslim community, more. The Muslim Public Affairs Council Impact reports that about a third of all foiled al-

Qaida-related plots in the U.S. relied on support or information provided by members of the Muslim community. This is a very important observation.

Let me offer an example. Faisal Shahzad, trying to blow up a car bomb on Times Square, was foiled because a Senegalese Muslim reported a suspicious car on the scene. I guarantee you that people who step forward engage in these interventions because they trusted their government enough with that information, not because they fear the government. It's a very important point.

In fact, another example was – we saw an example of this collaboration when American Muslim families from Virginia reported to the U.S. authorities that their children were suspiciously missing in Pakistan. Again, collaboration leading to effective deterrence and apprehension.

This cooperation in preventing acts of terrorism is precisely why Congress must design public policy with the understanding that we are all safer when Congress abides by its constitutional mandate to protect civil liberties. Moving away from constitutional principles in pursuit of the idea of security erodes the necessary trust between law enforcement and Americans to keep our country safe.

It's not either/or, but both civil liberties and public safety. I urge my fellow members of Congress to use their voices and their votes and their influence within their districts to promote greater partnership and cooperation, at all levels of government, between themselves and all communities, including the Muslim community at home and abroad.

And right now, we're still trying to engage foreign assistance with other countries, based on the foreign aid bill that has not yet been reauthorized since 1963. To think that we can effectively address the global challenges posed by 21<sup>st</sup>-century terrorism within the framework of an act written so long ago is simply wrong. We should also try to think in a fair, impartial way about what our government is doing in other parts of the world, to ask how our policies affect the lives of ordinary men, women and children.

Now, in Minnesota we have unique challenges of our own. I'm honored to serve the people of the 5<sup>th</sup> congressional district and the prosperity and the safety of my constituents is my utmost priority. And I'm alarmed and appalled to hear reports about young Somalis from Minnesota being lured and recruited to fight abroad.

And this is very, very concerning to me and several people are being prosecuted for such recruitment right now. I can assure you that families support this. Families are concerned about their young, the young men and, even, in a few cases, women who were tempted to go abroad to fight in foreign lands and in Somalia.

Minneapolis is one of the most diverse cities in our country and I see all ends of the spectrum. I've seen the local faces of parents in my district, as they share fears about their children being drawn into lives of violent extremism. I've also seen struggles of communities to build civil society and institutions against an array of social, cultural and institutional challenges.

And while the media sometimes highlight stories of alienated Somali youth, I can speak about many Somali youth who are integral to making my district a better place.

But I'm also keenly aware that there are some who are feeling disenfranchised and believe that – and I believe we should continue to work with civil society figures to integrate them and to make them feel psychologically and actually a part of our community. This is an extension of work I've been doing with Mayor Rybak on strategies to reduce youth violence and to think about gang recruitment as a public health issue.

Like other fathers in Minneapolis and around the country, I'm concerned about the use of the Internet as a tool to sway impressionable young minds towards radicalism. And I know that radical clerics like Anwar al-Awlaki and those recruiters of those Somali youth use Internet to preach their destructive philosophy. And on the face of this, we must be vigilant to protect our children from these messages with our presence and our values.

And we have to be smart enough and sharp enough to understand that these deceivers use the aesthetics of Islam to persuade. They are not ham-handed. They are not inarticulate. They are slick; they are manipulative. They know enough passages of the Quran just to be dangerous. And so therefore, we need the community to step forward and to come forward with a smarter, fuller, truer message in order to combat this.

We owe it to ourselves and our country to probe deeper into this issue of homegrown terrorism. Even if the issue still only represents a tiny fraction of the American Muslim community, it's not enough to say that not all terrorists are Muslim or to say that Islam is a religion of peace. It certainly is that, but when other Americans see people using Islam, exploiting it for violence, it's hard to keep them convinced.

Faisal Shahzad should be a wake-up call for all of us because he's not like the 9/11 hijackers. Let's reflect on that. The 9/11 hijackers were foreign-born, foreign-educated. And aside from the faith they allegedly professed, American Muslims almost had nothing in common with these guys. But Shahzad's case is different. He's a naturalized U.S. citizen, educated in the U.S., obtained an MBA. It seemed like America was working for him.

And it's for this reason that his actions should give us pause. We must look inward to examine why a person like him would choose to commit this heinous act of terrorism. That means that, as American Muslims, we have to tackle the moral logic that some Muslims use to justify violence in the name of religion. To say glibly that Islam is a religion of peace ignores the reality that there are some Muslims, to our horror, distort Islam and advocate violence. We have to be at the forefront of correcting the record.

The best defenses against extremist ideology are social inclusion and civic engagement. We should build on the tremendous strides that American Muslims have made in all aspects of public life and civil society. There are Americans who work in all branches of government and in all branches of our armed services who profess Islam. This is part of the American Muslim story that more Americans need to hear.

And so let me say in conclusion that it's essential that we recognize that when my friend put his hand on my shoulder and looked into my eyes and said, look, you know why I'm telling you this, that it wasn't a condemnation. It was simply an expectation that the Muslim community be at the forefront of protecting our country, like all other Americans are.

And we have a unique opportunity to be of great service to this nation by correcting and telling the true story of what Islam is all about, by engaging in civil integration and dialogue with our youth so that they can look for other ways to express their political ideas than be susceptible to radical extremists who would lure them in with a slick media-savvy message, and that we understand that we understand that civil rights, civil liberties, the rule of law are not an impediment to protecting Americans, but actually co-equal in protecting our safety and our liberty.

So with that, I just want to thank you for listening. I hope this is the beginning of a conversation that we will continue to have. There is much more to be learned about this topic and much more action that needs to be taken. And I think if there is an end – and I'm sure there will be – to this era that we're living in now, we'll all be much better for it because we'll be much more engaged, much more alert and much more on watch to protect our country and our liberties as we do so.

So with that, thank you very much. (Applause.) I don't know how much time we have left, but we could take a few questions or comments. Yes, sir?

Q: Could you tell us what you think are the roots of radicalization, other than the Internet propaganda?

REP. ELLISON: Well, as I said before, it's rooted in alienation of youth. It's rooted in the fact that there are – if you listen to what someone like Awlaki says on the YouTube, he talks about existing conflicts in the world that reasonable people can have various points of view about – conflicts like Kashmir, things that happened to Muslims in Kosovo, things that are happening in Iraq or Afghanistan; obviously, the Israel-Palestine conflict – and takes those existing conflicts and then offers a solution that is not based on working a process, engaging with a political solution, but simply is an instant gratification, expression of rage.

So it's similar to gang recruiting. It's similar to anyone who would try to lure people into a group that would engage in what is essentially antisocial, criminal behavior. But the Internet is merely a tool, obviously, for good or for bad. But there's no doubt that it is employed by people who want to engage in recruiting.

And you can watch this gentleman on YouTube anytime you like. He's right there. And you'll discover that he's articulate, that he's charismatic and that he knows how to pluck the emotional string. And therefore, people who are combating him have to be more effective than even he is. Way in the back?

Q: (Off mike.)

REP. ELLISON: I can't hear you.

Q: My name is Nia Yang (ph). I have a strong belief and evidence that –

REP. ELLISON: (Chuckles.) Sorry, I could hear you fine and then your mike went out. Okay, keep going.

Q: Yeah. I mean, this time, are racism and hate crime and labeling people as inferior, or racial profiling – these are related to the – (inaudible) – criminal network operation, which is including – (inaudible) – conduct in government, again, among three branches of government because they have reverted to the private sector – whether it's financial institutions, or even government agencies – (inaudible).

REP. ELLISON: Okay, thank you very much.

Q: We can – (inaudible).

REP. ELLISON: Thank you. Thank you very much. Next. Yes, sir?

Q: Bill Monroe (ph), I work for National Journal. I have two minor questions. You say al-Awlaki knows to pluck the emotional strings. Does faith in Islam make it easier for people to have their strings plucked? And I'm thinking of passages in the Quran which say, defend the ummah. Go to war for jihad.

And secondly, you talked about how the young people are seeking instant gratification on issues related to Kashmir, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine. In what extent does delayed gratification differ, in political terms, from instant gratification? Should these young men – are you urging these young men to work for political means to win Kashmir back for Islam, to engage in political means to win Iraq for some particular cause, rather than violent means?

REP. ELLISON: Well, let me just take your first question first. What I understood you to be asking, does religious devotion make somebody inclined toward violent radicalization? Absolutely not. And the proof is that the people who are most learned in Islamic jurisprudence are almost never found involved in violent radicalization.

It is these folks who have, sort of, an amateur's level of proficiency, who have memorized a few verses, taken then out of context, that you find mixed up in these things. None of the 19 were known as Islamic scholars. Awlaki is not an Islamic scholar. And so the answer is clearly no.

Devotion to faith is devotion to faith. It's a good thing. It's something that we have a constitutional right to do as Americans, to worship our faith as we choose to. Now, the thing – the linchpin is, somebody who is outraged, somebody who has no understanding of how to address their concerns and someone who is alienated, vulnerable. And again, I think that these –

and one of the points that I try to make is that I don't think we know, as a society, enough about violent radicalization.

We need to study it more. I believe that Congress should empanel a commission to delve into violent radicalization. And we should have a diverse group on the panel, so that we can really dig at the roots of what motivates people to behave in this way so that it can guide our policy, so that we're actually going to be effective, as opposed to operating on innuendo and knee-jerk sort of ideas.

And I mentioned – you asked about this instant gratification. The reality is that Americans of all kinds, people the world over, have various points of view about what they view as an extremely objectionable political circumstance. And the question is, do people take a rage-based approach to it or do they work a process that is peaceful, that is nonviolent, where they use courts, freedom of expression and the ballot to advance their point of view?

I think that when I talk about instant gratification, I mean people who don't want to use the ballot, use the court, use the public square to offer their views. And I think that – and that's what I'm concerned about. Now, to win something – to win, you know, you used the term, win Kashmir for Islam.

The fact is that, you know, as a Muslim, you're supposed to be trying to win truth, justice, compassion, fairness, decency for everyone, the world over. And this idea of dividing the world into different sectors, I would submit to you, is an un-Quranic, medieval idea that doesn't have any sway in the current debate and is employed by people who want to divide and promote, I think, a destructive ideology.

Q: (Off mike.)

REP. ELLISON: Not all.

Q: (Off mike.)

REP. ELLISON: Well, let me put it like this. You know, I'm not going to say that this individual is this. I'm speaking, obviously, about broader categories of people. And if you pluck out an individual and you want me to say, is he an amateur or not, I'm not here to – that's really missing the essential point of what I'm saying.

What I'm saying to you is, if you look at people who have committed catastrophic acts of violence, claiming that it has to do with their inspiration as a Muslim, these people are not scholarly individuals. And I think that I can stand on that statement. Next question. Yeah, right here?

Q: Thank you. Does this work? Great. Since I've been reminded that it's Bastille Day, I wanted to ask you a question about one of our allies. In France, obviously there is a lot of concern about the questions of integration and social inclusion and whether Islam is an obstacle to that. But at the same time, there's a huge youth unemployment rate. I think it's approaching a

quarter. And they don't do statistics based on race or religion in France but it's fairly clear that Muslim youth are disproportionately affected by this. And so as America is not – you know, obviously faces a severe unemployment as well, do you see job-creation as a national security concern?

REP. ELLISON: Well, let me tell you, I think that economic factors, obviously, must be a part of any calculus about maintaining public order and safety. There's no doubt about that. And so I think that it's a very – and every society throughout history has known you have massive poverty, alienation, unemployment, you're going to have a social problem. And I think that it's wise to deal very directly with that population and offer opportunity and inclusion.

And not only material inclusion but also psychological and emotional inclusion. And I hope we really weigh that factor in as an important one as well because it's important to give somebody a job but it's also important for someone to see themselves as fully French or American or whatever country you may be referring to.

And if you engage in economic opportunity but social isolation and alienation, you will also lead up with – you know, have dissatisfaction and have certain – a small percentage, but certain individuals who are susceptible to manipulation. So good question and thank you very much.

I think we're about there. Let me thank all of you for your excellent questions and I look forward to us really continuing this conversation and developing and deepening our understanding and then taking action to make our country safer and maintaining our freedoms. Thank you.

FAIZ SHAKIR: Good morning. My name is Faiz Shakir. I'm the vice president at the Center for American Progress and editor-in-chief of our blog, thinkprogress.org. I'm pleased that you're able to join us this morning for the continuation of our discussion about countering homegrown terrorist acts that emanate from violent extremists who subscribe to a Muslim-based ideology. We have an all-star panel with us to engage in this discussion.

This is a discussion that the Center for American Progress is engaging in more and more. We have a national security staff led by Ken Gude, Caroline Wadhams, Brian Katulis, who are talking about this; Sally Steenland, who is helping us with progressive outreach to faith communities. So this is an area that we're keenly interested in. And this discussion will help challenge our thinking on this.

Joining with the national security network we've put together, an esteemed panel to discuss this. I am first going to apologize to the panel because I am going to rush through your bios because we are – we have five panelists, as you see, and we want to talk about the issues. You came to listen to them, not me introduce them, but I will rush through this very quickly.

So to my left is Pradeep Ramamurthy. He is the senior director for global engagement at the national security staff at the White House. He's been a career civil servant, served in the FBI

and DNI previously and I think is charged with helping structure the message of engagement towards the Muslim community.

To his left is Rashad Hussain. Rashad earlier this year was appointed by President Obama to be the special envoy to the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Prior to that, he was counsel on the White House Counsel staff. I think he is charged with the mission – correct me if I’m wrong – of trying to fulfill the promise in the Cairo speech, which was building mutual respect and mutual interests with the Muslim community both here and abroad.

To his left is Professor David Schanzer. David Schanzer is associate professor of the practice for public policy at Duke University. That’s the Sanford School of Public Policy up there. And he is also the director of the Triangle Center of Terrorism and Homeland Security.

He has written a great deal about this issue and a whole host of homeland security and national security issues. But most relevant was one that I plucked out. It’s been a widely cited National Institute of Justice study which was called “Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim American,” so we’re anxious to hear about some of those lessons.

Next to him is Nadia Roumani, who is the director of the American Muslim Civic Leadership Institute, which I refer to as AMCLI. She, in my world, is convener of leaders in the Muslim community helping to develop some of the next generation’s leaders, both in the political world but in a whole host of local and community and state-based partnerships.

I think the Washington Post had a good summary of what her and her organization are trying to do, which is a trend that is capturing the many – the emergence of an American Muslim civic identity, which is to say how Islam inspires its followers to be better citizens in America.

And next to her is William Bratton, who is a distinguished, long-time dedicant (sic) to the career of law enforcement. He’s a native Bostonian, as you’ll be able to tell from his accent, who rose up the (dove ?) chart to lead the Boston police department and then holds the distinguished reputation of being the only one to lead – to be the commissioner of both the New York Police Department and, later, the Los Angeles Police Department. He is now the chairman Altegrity International, which does security consulting.

All right, let’s get to the Q&A. I want to start with our premise – Pradeep, we’ll go to you, first – which is that this issue of Muslim extremism, of the homegrown variety, is a serious issue. And I want to challenge that presumption on its face and ask you whether that is, first, the most serious threat we’re confronting and whether it’s minimizing other threats. We remember seeing a report from the Homeland Security Department which said that racial and hate groups were a serious problem and we saw that played out in attacks at the Holocaust museum, attacks on the IRS building, attacks on the Pentagon employees. Are we minimizing other instances or is this really the most serious problem that we need to dedicate our federal resources towards?

PRADEEP RAMAMURTHY: The first thing I’d say on this issue is this is – domestic – (inaudible, off mike) – is a topic that we’ve been paying attention to since the beginning of the administration. You know, I remember NCTC director Leiter talk to the president about it. It

was one of the first topics that he spoke to the president about. Frankly, it was the focus of one of my first sessions with John Brennan on, I think, January 21<sup>st</sup>. So it's a topic that we saw as something that we needed to pay attention to, something that definitely needed dedicated focus.

And in terms of this question, I mean, I think what we've seen, especially over the last year-and-a-half is a clear trend of an increased number of Americans mobilized to violence. Whether that represents a trend of greater radicalization, I think those are two related but distinct questions. We've seen more Americans that have carried out violence in the United States and also being recruited to go abroad. And it's an issue that we're leveraging the whole of government.

And frankly, as Congressman Ellison pointed out, it's a whole-of-nation challenge; one that requires the federal government, I think, to be more coordinated here in D.C., increase our engagement with our federal offices around the country but also help empower some of our state and local governments, including the law enforcement community that often has the first touch on these issues, but also one that requires a partnership with the people of the United States, particularly the American Muslim community.

The question that you're asking, I mean, I think – to be clear about it, I think this is a threat that's unique in the sense that some of the motivations for it, some of the people that are recruiting people to carry out this type of violence are people that are using the rhetoric of al-Qaida to kind of generate this, kind of.

And are helping to – what we see in terms of factors that affect radicalization is – one of the unifying themes is this kind of narrative that the West is at war with Islam. And that narrative is what we see across, I think, almost all of the people that we have confronted in this threat. They come from different backgrounds, different education levels, different socioeconomic status, different parts of the country, different parts of the world, even.

But that notion that the West is at war with Islam is a unifying theme or narrative that they buy into. And, certainly, that they use to justify their bonds. And in that way, I think it is different from some of the other threats that we've seen domestically.

MR. SHAKIR: Commissioner Bratton, I want to go to you next. Rep. Ellison laid out, I think, a good basis for understanding some of this and highlighted some of the acts of Muslims in the communities who have helped thwart or prevent or disrupt acts of terror. In your experience, how hard is it building those relationships and how integral is it to the actual law-enforcement operation?

WILLIAM J. BRATTON: (Inaudible) – is that in the 1990s, American policing embraced a new paradigm of policing called community policing. And it was the idea that police alone could not protect the cities of America growing from violence in the '70s and '80s.

And community policing philosophy has three elements: partnership, problem-solving and, most importantly, the focus on prevention. The partnerships were not only among the law-

enforcement community, federal, state, local, but most importantly, with communities to understand what their priorities were, what their concerns were, what their fears were.

And in the '90s, it was principally focused on the African-American and growing Latino populations and their historic and justified mistrust of policing. As we move into the 21<sup>st</sup> century with, now, the paradigm expanding to encompass terrorism and the growing concern over the last 10 years and the acceleration of homegrown terrorism, there is a model of policing that is being used and I'll speak very specifically to Los Angeles.

My most recent experience in which we were able to reach out, fairly quickly, to a community – in this case, the Muslim community – that we'd had almost no interaction with. And we were following the lead of the FBI in Los Angeles and the lead of Lee Baca, the sheriff. So we were a little late coming to the game in terms of our exposure to the Muslim community of Los Angeles.

But that police community forum among many forums that we have – African-American, Latino, gay and lesbian, has very quickly become one of the most active forums in Los Angeles in the sense of trying to build understanding, trying to embrace the idea that we are in this together. If we are going to prevent terrorism, radicalization from taking hold, we need to, one, know each other. We need to understand each other – police, government, Muslim community, the Muslim religion.

So as I'm sitting here today, 2010, versus 2002 when I took over as police chief in Los Angeles, I'm feeling much more optimistic. Despite the fog of war, if you will, that we're living in – there's a movie a few years ago, McNamara talking about his regrets about the Vietnam War and the mistakes that were made in the fog of war.

Well, fog is thick and it dissipates and it becomes thin. And we're learning these last 10 years, these nine years since 9/11 that we're getting better at understanding to defeat terrorism, to prevent it to the best of our ability, that we're going to have to have increased understanding and partnerships. And local police are going to be a key element of that.

Secretary of Homeland Secretary Janet Napolitano and certainly President Obama understand that and there's been an intense focus at Homeland Security on focusing on hometown security as the essential component of homeland security.

MR. SHAKIR: (Inaudible) – in the community, meeting with, talking to Muslims both here and abroad. One of the questions I have is whether the Muslim community views this as a serious enough issue within their own community. Are they hesitant to discuss it in your experience or is this something that they're embracing and saying that we do have a problem; we're trying to minimize it. What's been your experience?

RASHAD HUSSAIN: I think that goes directly to the question of ideology, which has been discussed a little bit today and that's something that I want to touch on. To me, ideology continues to be kind of a common threat in many of these cases and that is that you have

individuals who believe – or profess to believe – that it’s somehow acceptable in Islam to take the life of innocent people, to address any particular grievances that they’ve had.

And the question that I want to pose is, why is it that this ideology is allowed to creep into the minds of young people that we’re losing when religious organizations have been unequivocal on this issue, that terrorism must be rejected.

Religious scholars have been unequivocal and there’s nearly a consensus amongst religious scholars, fatwa after fatwa, after statement after statement, and I’m talking about qualified religious scholars because in order to issue a fatwa, you have to have certain requisite knowledge. You have to have knowledge of the Koran, Sunnah, usool al-fiqh , Sirah, “The Life of the Prophet, and so – and there’s, you know, the knowledge of other relevant Islamic sciences.

And the people that are making statements the other way – it should be noted – don’t have those requisite qualifications. So the Anwan al-Awlaki’s of the world, Adam Gadahn’s, Ayman al-Zawahiri, some of these people that rile people up – they don’t have that necessary training in all those sciences to even be qualified to become a mufti. And so you have a consensus of the Islamic scholars; you have a consensus of Muslim organizations.

You have a consensus of Islamic leaders. You have government officials, you know, the president in the Cairo speech making clear that this is something that Islam rejects, quoting a very famous verse from the Koran, you know – (in Arabic). It’s as if they’ve killed all of humanity if they kill one innocent person. And there’s verses in the Koran which talk about the penalty for unintentionally killing another Muslim, you know, much less intentionally killing another Muslim.

There’s severe penalties for that and you know, it’s of course important to note that you know, 80 percent of, you know, some estimates say that of victims of terrorism are Muslims themselves. And so on the ideological point, why is it that all the evidence, all the scholars, all the leaders, all the community are one side and we’re still losing some people to this? And I think that Congressman Ellison touched on some of the answers.

One is that the people that are pushing people towards violence are using sophisticated means such as, you know, new media, glorifying violence. They’re taking certain verses out of context, even though they’re not qualified in order to do so. And really, this is creating a problem by which, you know, are attracting young people even though they don’t have, you know, the requisite knowledge to do so.

And oftentimes, what they do is they’ll go through various foreign policy grievances or any, you know, grievances that they have against policies of any country and they’ll, you know, kind of rile people up, rile people up, rile people up. And then at the end, they’ll say, therefore you take – therefore, the solution is to take up arms.

So you know, some of the suggestions that I have heard that are coming from within the community is that in response to this – and I think we’re starting to see this happen is that Muslim leaders – qualified Muslim scholars – have to say look, using equally sophisticated

technology, that you may have this grievance, this grievance and this grievance and those all may be grievances which we acknowledge as well.

They may have a different – as Congressman Ellison said, there’s – you know, different people have different opinions on these issues. But despite that, Islam clearly rejects violence and therefore, it must be rejected unequivocally and that really, the foreign policy grievance you have against any particular government is not a justification.

You know, regardless of what you think is going on in Israel and Palestine – and if that were a true – or Afghanistan or Iraq or any of the other justifications that are often mentioned. And if that were truly the reason why many people are doing this, you know, then why is it that 80 to 90 percent of the victims of violent extremism are Muslims? If you’re upset about what’s happening in Israel and Palestine, why are you going into a mosque after Friday prayer – as we saw last week – a triple suicide bombing and killing so many other Muslims?

So really, these excuses about foreign policy are being manipulated. The Koran is being manipulated. And this ideology, which really seems to cut at the core of a lot of these cases must be rejected in really sophisticated ways and unequivocal ways which includes making it clear that despite any foreign policy grievance that you have against any government, that this corrupt ideology must be rejected.

MR. SHAKIR: Nadia, I want to jump off a point that Rashad is harping on – important point – and I don’t know if you saw but this last Sunday on CNN, Fareed Zakaria was interviewing a radical British-Muslim cleric, Anjem Choudary. And in the Q&A with Anjem, Fareed mentions that – Rashad’s point, which is a lot of these acts of terror are killing fellow Muslims. What do you have to say in response to that?

And for those of you who watched it, Choudary kept hedging, couldn’t answer and at one point, when pressed and pressed on this issue, says, well, the CIA and Blackwater are really the ones who are killing everybody and they’re blaming it on the mujahideen. So it launched into conspiracy theory.

I wonder to what extent in the Muslim community is there this concern of not in our name, that there are violent actors who are taking acts who are killing fellow Muslims but we are not going to stand up and allow that to happen. To what extent is that a concern that’s starting grow or get hold of the community?

NADIA ROUMANI: Sure. I think – I think there’s some interesting conversations that are happening within the community and then between the community and those working on the issue outside the community. Within the community, I think for a long time, it’s been a question of this isn’t representative of the community.

It’s such a small, marginal, you know, isolated incidents that aren’t connected to what the community believes or how the community acts. But I think what’s beginning to happen is there’s a need to engage on the issue because these are dwarfing any other – any other work – positive work – that is happening in the community. There’s no – the way in which the society is

framing the Muslim community is exclusively through this lens and so it's becoming an issue – the need to respond.

But what's interesting and I think it goes to the question you asked Rashad about, you know, to what extent is a community aware or even involved? And I think it's, you know, been kind of slowly entering into this conversation after, you know, really working within the community for a while and I'm realizing that these are really isolated and siloed conversations.

Or if you go into the counterterrorism, you know, groups and you know, they can rattle off every single attempted act and who's tried it and where they've tried it and you know, they've had the list of who's on the, you know, the watch list or whatever. But when you go into the Muslim community, there's really not as much information about this because it hasn't been in open discussion within the community.

And even if you were to say, has a community even watched – if you ask an average community member, have they watched al-Awlaki's videos? They'll say we don't even want to click on them because we don't want to watch them on our computers so that you know, if our computer's ever taken, it's not on – I mean, it's really this question about where is the conversation and what are the issues that are being discussed?

And so there's this – and a lot of the conversations between government and between the community has been one-way information gathering and not necessarily information sharing. And so there's a need to have a conversation internally about that. And then taking it one step further, it's also how we're framing the conversation because I think a lot of times, the way it's being framed is as the community needs to be monitored.

And if you're monitoring the community, that's assuming that every Muslim is a potential terrorist and that's not really how the community views itself. I think the question needs to be, especially if we're getting into the solution-driven approach to it, which is not just on the violent extremism, but on all the other issues that are dealing with crisis is how do you build infrastructure within a community to deal with and prevent crisis? How do you build that infrastructure that engages young people, that deals with leadership crisis issues, that deals with law enforcement, community engagement?

How do you build the infrastructure for a long-term engagement and that's what's been missing. It can't only be through this kind of surveillance and monitoring or even community policing is a very powerful concept, but when the community hears it, it's seen as monitoring. And so it's about how we engage this conversation at the get-go with the community to see how it partners.

MR. SHAKIR: Professor Schanzer, there's a recurring theme. We saw it in the Q&A with Rep. Ellison about what is causing some of this radicalism to take place. I think in the profiles of Faisal Shahzad, we saw that there was a degree of estrangement, alienation in his life. He had separated from his wife.

His wife went off to Saudi Arabia. He was losing his house. There was a whole host of issues there. He didn't feel a part of the social structure, it seemed. In your experience, what – I guess, is that one of the factors you see? What are the roots of radicalization? What does this literature tell us here?

DAVID SCHANZER: First of all, I think – there's one thing I think we know for certain and that is that there are many different paths to radicalization and I think we should be very skeptical of anybody who comes up and says, well, I have the answer and here's the story. The second thing that you know, the people who radicalize, you know, there is no profile either in terms of their history, their background, ethnicity; some radicalize alone.

Some radicalize with peer groups. Some are connected with foreign terrorist organizations. Some are not. If you look at ethnicity, the study that we did show that of the Muslim-American community, we had virtually equal numbers of – since 9/11 – of people with South-Asian, Middle-Eastern, African-American, white backgrounds. So the thing, I think, that – you know, this theme of alienation, though, I think is very important.

There's something – some dissatisfaction in people's lives that drives them to this ideology, that makes them vulnerable to it and then they are attracted to it. But you know, we've been doing criminology for you know, 20, 30 years since the real boom in crime. And we don't really know why two kids in an urban setting who grow up in the same family, one of them goes off and joins a gang and ends up in jail and the other makes it through high school and gets a good job.

So we haven't answered that question and we don't really know enough about this process which radicalization and this kind of radicalization we're talking about – we've been studying for much shorter amounts of time. So there's still a lot of very open questions. One thing that I think that concerns me that I just wanted to throw into the conversation is you know, so why are we seeing alienation in the United States?

Some people – scholars like Marc Sageman hypothesized in a book a couple years ago that the American experience was different – the American-Muslim community was better educated, wealthier than other communities in the Muslim diaspora. We were more immune to these influences.

So – and I don't see – you know, I don't think there's any evidence of a cause-and-effect relationship here, but I am concerned about the tone of public discourse over the past nine years and barriers, perhaps, to Muslim youth in terms of forming a strong American identity. I'm not saying that's infecting the entire community; it's absolutely not.

High levels of patriotism, government service, military service, but I do think that – and I'm not just talking about hate crimes or overt governmental policy, but dialogue and tone in the country, on the Internet, in political discourse, in our communities, where there's – people who are out there saying things like you can't be a faithful Muslim and a faithful American at the same time.

And that people can say things about Muslim-Americans and Islam that they couldn't say about any other racial or ethnic group and still be respected or still hold a high position in their community. And I think that's a troubling trend and I can't say that's caused the Hassan's and the Shahzad's. But it's out there and I think it has to be part of the conversation.

MR. SHAKIR: Pradeep, I want to turn to the al-Awlaki conversation really quickly. He's been mentioned a number of times already. Keith Ellison – Rep. Ellison mentioned him as well. I want to take a little counterintuitive approach a little bit too. I wonder if we're making a mistake by talking about him too much.

Are we making him a superstar? Are we making him a leader of the movement? Are we causing other people who may not have otherwise known about him and feel like they need a leader of a radical movement to gravitate toward him? Is there a concern there that we're turning him into a superstar?

PRADEEP RAMAMURTHY: I think it's a good question. I mean one of the things that I think we need to be aware of and look, I don't know whether al-Awlaki is – as Congressman Ellison pointed out – charismatic individual, speaks English fluently with an American accent, you know, is clearly targeting youth in certainly the United States, English-speaking world more generally. And he's also been a figure that several people have been inspired by.

That said, I mean I also think that it's worth noting that the American-Muslim community has actually explicitly rejected al-Awlaki and has also made it quite clear that al-Awlaki's not just a – you know, he is a terrorist. I mean the latest video where he kind of appears in front of an al-Qaida logo – an AQAP logo kind of makes that abundantly clear.

And one of the interesting things – just going back to something Nadia was saying is, you know, we are actually, now, trying to be more proactively educating not just American-Muslim communities, but communities more generally about what threat we see. And one of the things that we found is this issue that a lot of parents in these communities haven't actually seen al-Awlaki and the videos and haven't seen how crystal clear his call for violence and murder is. But you know, the point you're making about kind of increasing his profile, I mean I think that's clearly something he wants. He wants to be seen as an influential figure.

I think that the other issue is one of resonance. You know, al-Qaida – I mean, I think it's worth noting that al-Qaida has tried a lot of things. You know, making videos, issuing statements, et cetera. Trying new things doesn't necessarily mean increasing your audience share.

And there has actually been in the last couple years growing public condemnation of al-Qaida. I think you've seen now growing public condemnation of Awlaki. I think you've seen in major parts of the world growing rejection of bin Laden. With a couple days ago the incident in Kampala with groups like al-Shabaab, just public condemnation of that, public rejection of that. And you know, I think the issue is that to the degree that this guy is being talked about, I think he's increasingly being talked about as someone that is a terrorist who is inspiring people to murder.

MR. SHAKIR: Commissioner Bratton.

MR. BRATTON: A question for all the panelists relative to Awlaki and others like him who have captured the imagination from time-to-time, whether it was some of the al-Qaida operatives in Iraq and now Awlaki and basically worldwide in terms of what he's talking about: Is there within the Muslim community an inspirational figure or figures that can counter his rhetoric? In a country where we have – usually if you got somebody spouting off on this side, there is somebody spouting off on that side that has the name recognition. You watch all the morning political shows – Good Morning Joe and the rest of them – point, counterpoint.

I just don't have enough intimacy with that side of the equation coming from a policing background, a lot of the focus, even though we're trying to develop better community relations, that a lot of our focus is on identifying the Awlakis and those that might be radicalized. But what about that: the idea that somebody that can be that charismatic to bring youth in the proper direction rather than going in the wrong direction following characters like him?

MR. RAMAMURTHY: Nadia was – (inaudible, cross talk).

MR. SHAKIR: Yeah, sure, you go first and then Nadia.

MR. RAMAMURTHY: One thing, you know, I would say John Brennan pointed this out during his talk at CSIS. And I think one thing that is worth noting here is I'm not sure that the existing – and there's a sizable existing literature of public condemnation of al-Qaida, suicide bombing, of terrorism, of Awlaki – gets the type of visibility that it should be getting.

MR. BRATTON: It just doesn't get to the person we're talking about that he's talking to. You know, the pope might speak for the Catholic Church, but is he basically reaching those in the Catholic Church that need to be reached? That similarly here, does all of that, you know, in terms of whether it be the White House or the leadership of the religious community – is it reaching that 16-year-old kid that's sitting in his basement basically hitting the blogs and never watching the national news or is basically not getting into a mosque on Fridays?

MS. ROUMANI: Well, I think it's getting at two issues: One is the overall – one is how to deal, specifically in response to someone like al-Awlaki. And then one is the overarching, where are the kind of leadership and where is the leadership that's responding.

In response to al-Awlaki, the question is, there are – condemnation, I think, is the first step and I think that there's been a broad sweep of condemnation. But what we actually need to start doing is getting people who are responding from within the same ideological framework and responding with the same about – that has the same perceived religious authority.

I am not saying – there's the perceived religious authority and then there's religious authority, is what Rashad spoke to, but this is a perceived religious authority within that community of people. And so what you have are a lot of condemnations and responses from people that are seen as more progressive or on the outskirts. And that won't have the same

credibility with those youth that are following that specific logic. And so in a sense you have to be working from within that construct.

But then it gets to the broader issue of how do you engage – where is the leadership? And I think that's the bigger question – kind of, where is that response on a broader level? And this is where the complexity of the Muslim community gets, you know, with Muslims coming from 80 different countries in here, from different schools of thought, it gets much more complex because there's not clear – it's not like, you know, the church and all that where you have a clear leadership and defined leadership.

You have a lot of self-appointed spokespersons, you have people who are kind of speaking out. But the question is, who is actually leading processes that are engaging young people in conversations and who is seen as leadership that is engaging especially youth? And that's the challenge because it's been a crisis – a lot of young people aren't going to mosques, so they're not going there. They're not engaged in kind of community engagement activities. But they're looking for role models and they're looking for religious authority. And that's been a challenge for a lot of them to find that.

MR. SHAKIR: Let me get to Rashad here real quick because on this question of perceived religious authority, many of you may not know this, but Rashad was chosen by President Obama for many reasons, one of which is he's got quite a degree of religious authority. He has memorized the Quran, which is a special gift that not many people have, and has a degree of credibility in this community that Nadia is talking about.

I want to – going back to Awlaki though, the question of are we doing enough – once we've increased their profile, are we doing enough to delegitimize them? It's one thing to put out statements of condemnation, but to delegitimize – for instance, do many people know that he solicited prostitutes when he lived in the United States and was arrested for that? Do people know of the backgrounds of some of the 9/11 hijackers who had done acts that were deemed un-Islamic? Isn't that the sort of thing that discredits them in the Muslim community, if known?

MR. HUSSAIN: Well, there are leaders within the Muslim community that I feel are more well-known than Anwar al-Awlaki that have come out and been very strong on this. I know there was one video that I saw by a prominent American Muslim leader where he directly addressed Awlaki and Awlaki's message and issued a video particularly for that purpose.

And you know, part of the problem is that they haven't publicized enough by the media. Part of the problem is, is that I think the community is getting to this state now where these videos are getting more sophisticated and they have more of an appeal to the youth. So I think that the leaders are doing it. I mean, as I mentioned earlier, I think it's a matter of being more sophisticated in reaching populations.

Also, I agree with this point that Nadia made, that you can't just look to the leaders that you might be more comfortable with so to speak. I mean, a lot of the people that are going to be most persuasive on this issue are very, very conservative, very traditional Islamic scholars. And the vast, overwhelming majority of those, too, are people that explicitly reject this. They may be

the types of people that don't necessarily want to get so much involved in political debates. They won't talk about those types of issues in their Friday sermons.

But if you ask them about this, then they'll say, of course, this is obvious. This is something that if you go through the Quran, you go through the sayings and the actions of the Prophet, then this is something that must be rejected. So I think that there can be more of an emphasis in getting some of those voices and some of those more conservative people out in front on these issues. And you know, that can happen not only in formats like social media, but I mean, I've talked to a religious leader who actually raised this exact point with me, who said that he was abroad and he was talking to young radical Muslims.

And the way that he persuaded them on the Awlaki issue was he let them know about this which was reported in The New York Times about the prostitution cases that you mentioned. And so that goes to the point where the reason why that is persuasive is because it goes to ideology. And once that person realized, hey, wait a minute. If that person can engage in that type of activity, maybe he doesn't have the religious authority that I think he does. And so if you can undermine that religious authority in different ways using different media and using a broader range of scholars on this issue, I think we actually can have a very positive impact.

MR. SHAKIR: Professor Schanzer, you want to jump in?

MR. SCHANZER: Well, I just think that I agree 100 percent with the issue of condemnation and delegitimization. But there also needs to be a kind of a counter-narrative and a positive message that kind of addresses the notion of grievance because grievance is where radicalization comes from.

So you need to have people, you know, and that's both within and without the Muslim community who are articulating a positive message that explains what the objectives are of American foreign policy and how we are trying to improve and taking concrete steps – and a lot of what President Obama talked about in Cairo are important messages that have to be part of this kind of counter-narrative, to have a positive story to go against the narrative that is being projected. Because I think just saying, well, this guy is bad, then they'll just be another spokesperson.

MR. RAMAMURTHY: I agree with this. And I mean, I think actually the president talked a little bit about this, but, you know, you look at – let's just take one event this week. You have al-Shabaab killing Africans in Africa at a time when Africa is hosting for the first time a very successful World Cup.

And you contrast that with kind of the vision for the future of Africa that people there want, that frankly, communities around the world, including, obviously, the United States, are helping build, you know, through our foreign assistance programs, Peace Corps. I mean, you could just go case-by-case.

I mean, you look at Pakistan last week. You have violent extremists attacking a Sufi shrine that is visited by Sunnis. And it's a Muslim shrine. I mean, what you have, I think at a

fundamental level, is a vision of destruction. And it's clearly contrasted, I think, with kind of the positive future that, whether it's Muslims here, abroad, Americans, non-Americans abroad, you know, everyone has a positive vision for their life, their children's lives.

And that's, I think, the thing that we've tried to be on the side of, both obviously within the United States – I mean, these are American citizens and we're working very closely through community engagement efforts. And you raised the point about explaining our foreign policy. In Minneapolis, for example, the State Department has been out multiple times to talk specifically about our foreign policy vis-à-vis Somalia, our counterterrorism policy in East Africa.

But you know, we are expanding that type of thing where we help communicate more directly about the specific issues that these communities care about. And the feedback mechanism for that is establishing those partnerships with both state and local governments but also with the communities themselves to understand what it is that they feel like they need more information about.

And then abroad, I think it really is this kind of emphasizing the positive vision that the president talked about in Cairo and how we're delivering on that, not just through the particular initiatives like the entrepreneurship summit and things like that Congressman Ellison mentioned, but every day, the United States is doing work in these countries, Americans are volunteering, working very much in partnership, I think, to build a positive future, which is in explicit contrast to the type of the violence, instability and destruction that people motivated by this ideology are focused on.

MR. SHAKIR: I mean, as I listen to that, Nadia, I have this question for you. I reflect on the fact that it seems the message is difficult coming from the U.S. government. It's also difficult coming from state actors, some of whom have dubious credibility amongst the populations that we're trying to reach. So I think the question for you is the importance of nongovernmental actors in sharing this message and whether there is a credible infrastructure in place that reaches these communities that has a degree of influence with them. Is there such things?

MS. ROUMANI: I think it's nascent. I think it's very nascent and it's starting to grow. I think the problem is that a lot of the discussion has been stopped at the condemnation and then the narrative. And I agree that both of those are absolutely critical. But then it stops there. And so there are a bunch of roundtables and there's a bunch of conversations.

But at the end of the day, what is actually happening at that infrastructure level? Where are there safe spaces for communities to engage in the conversation? These communities are in a pressure cooker and they're under a spotlight and they're being in a Petri dish all at once. You know, and so where are there safe spaces for these communities to engage on these issues? And also specifically for young people to engage them in, whether it's understanding the political process –

And so there are some programs that are trying to do that. I know IMPACT (sp 73:38) was doing one, MPSN was doing one. There's small programs that are trying to really engage young people in the political process is one part, so you go from conspiracy theory to actually how do you move through the system as Congressman Ellison spoke about.

But then also, where are you – the young people are getting so disenfranchised because of what's happening now on schools, in campuses – and where is their constructive alternatives that go beyond narrative and go to engagement? Whether it's about the issues or it's actually about mobilizing youth for a different purpose, whether it's mobilizing them for how to engage civically, but those are also –

And I just want to break that up into one last point on two different issues: There's long-term engagement and then there's short-term engagement. When it comes to issues of crisis engagement, that's also something that is totally missing on the infrastructure level. We're starting to build long-term engagement and that's great. And that's a natural evolution of a community that's young and in this country and learning about civic engagement.

But then where's the infrastructure on crisis engagement? So when there is an incident, what gets mobilized from within the community that goes beyond a press release? That's been the community's more often response is condemnation and press release. But we need to figure out, similar to what's happened in gang reduction issues, what is the community-led response to a moment of crisis where there's a young person or community that's engaged and then how does that community-led response interact with law enforcement because they are two pieces of the same puzzle.

MR. SHAKIR: Commissioner Bratton, I wanted to go there actually. You know that there's suspicion among some of these communities about dealing with law enforcement. You've seen it firsthand. I wonder to what extent it would be viewed as helpful when you take actions to protect civil liberties of the communities against sometimes condemning some acts of law enforcement community who may have stepped over the bounds as a message to the community that we're trying to protect your civil liberties. I know that that seems to be a type of message that the law enforcement community would perhaps recoil from.

MR. BRATTON: A spin off of the comment about gangs – certainly in New York and more specifically in L.A., the beginning of success against gangs, against gang activity, corners being turned, the level of gang violence being reduced dramatically over time. American policing can be a leading entity, if you will, a cutting-edge institution in dealing with this issue of terrorism because they have in fact been able to do that more recently in dealing with issues of, whether it's the African-American community or the gang community.

And one of the efforts has been to start recognizing that we couldn't just deal with church leaders in trying to reach the youth in gangs. We had to basically deal with the gang interventionists. And most cops don't want to have anything to do with them because they, oftentimes, they've got violent backgrounds, they're ex-convicts, that they're not the greatest people in the world to be interacting with.

But over the last decade in Los Angeles, there has been an embrace, particularly by police leadership and now pushing down to the gang officers themselves, that the only way we're going to actually start making inroads into this gang culture is working with these interventionist who are recognizing that the ideology they embraced, the gang life, the family life, the celebration of violence, somehow or another, they recognized that they want out and more importantly, they want to help others get out of it.

So for example, in Los Angeles, working with Connie Rice and others, there are now institutions to educate and train these gang interventionists to build relationships and credentials and to legitimize them so that they can talk with gang members. Similarly, in this initiative, I'm thinking as I'm listening to you, the idea – I have yet to see one of the fighters, if you will, who had embraced the ideology of taking on the West, to come out of that world. And I know Jordan has engaged – and Saudi Arabia – in trying to incorporate them back into a different life with some mixed success.

But there may be lessons learned from what American policing has learned in the last 20 years in dealing with major violent crime, particularly the potential for growth in gang violent crime. In this world here I think there's lessons to be learned. Certainly in my capacity as the former chief of Los Angeles, a lot of what I brought into dealing with terrorism I was taking from lessons learned in dealing with gangs, in dealing with issues of race in New York and Los Angeles. And I think we can be informed by that experience.

MR. SHAKIR: I have lots more questions for the panelists, but I want to make sure that I give some time to you guys who are sitting here patiently. Maybe we'll start here with a question and then –

(Off-side conversation.)

Q: I just wanted to pick up on that issue of a positive role model and ask the panelists to comment whether or not there has been any engagement of the American Muslim community with Hollywood because if you – I mean, the disconnect between policy discussions and political interaction and your 16-year-old sitting in the basement is probably pretty large. And if you look at what the image of Muslim is in Hollywood, there aren't very many positive role models.

I can think of only one off the top of my head. And there is a TV program that has actually had the – Bones, which is one of these mystery TV programs, that has had a Muslim American character, which was used, I think, very effectively. That character was used very effectively to talk about Islam. (Inaudible, background noise) – the panel would comment – (inaudible, cross talk) –

MR. SHAKIR: I think Nadia actually has a lot of expertise. For those of you who didn't hear, the question was about working with Hollywood to develop counter-images, counter-narratives in the Muslim community.

MS. ROUMANI: I mean, I think it's something that is starting to happen. I think you have organizations that have kind of Hollywood bureaus that are trying to engage with media

and film and things like – and there are work being done, I know, in certain, in the foundation world that's trying to support the arts and trying to show a positive narrative.

But I think that it kind of diverts a little bit away from this issue of countering violent extremism because I think, again, that is a positive long-term strategy about how to create a different narrative for a general American public, which is absolutely necessary to counteract the dominant stereotypes. And that's something that we have to do because there isn't that balanced narrative in the general public.

But I don't think it's necessarily targeting the more isolated segments of the community and very isolated segments of the community that are more prone into this conversation because they're not watching Bones. And you know, that's not their primary point of reference. And so I think it's a positive strategy, but I don't necessarily it's the strategy on this particular issue.

MR. SHAKIR: Pradeep, I wanted to jump to you real quick on this question of the message to the Muslim community on countering violent extremism. A prominent conservative think tank in Washington, the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs (WINA), put out a document criticizing to some degree the White House policy on this saying that you don't use the language of Islamist and Islamic enough in describing the ideology that you're up against. What do you say in reaction to that criticism?

MR. RAMAMURTHY: Well, I mean, I think John Brennan took this head on. Look, I think these are people that would love the credibility of being religious figures. And we're just not going to give them that credibility. I mean, I think there's not much more to say beyond that. I think the congressman wants to add that.

MR. SCHANZER: If I could just follow up on that, that we use this term Islamist or Islamic terror, that we are ratifying exactly what they are trying to say, which is that they represent Islam and that this is Islam. As a matter of fact, President Bush actually did a very good job throughout, with a couple of exceptions, I did a short little study on this – (chuckles) – about never, virtually never referring to terrorism as having that connection with Islam because you are – and why do you think almost every terrorist group has either the word Islam or some Islamic imagery in their name? It's because they are trying to use religion to bolster and magnify their message. So I can't understand why you would want to do that as a positive strategy.

MR. RAMAMURTHY: Let me say one other thing about this: I think one of the other points in the WINAP report was attacking the ideological foundations, right? I just want to say, you know, we're very clear-eyed about what that ideological foundation is. It is this narrative that the West is at war with Islam. And that is the ideological narrative that people get attached to.

And the way to counter that narrative is by demonstrating in word and deed how much a part of America Muslims are, how positive our engagement with Muslim communities abroad is, you know, demonstrating follow-through on things like the speech in Cairo. Those are the things

that kind of demonstrate and suck oxygen out of this narrative that somehow the United States and the West is fighting a war against a religion.

MR. SHAKIR: I want to – Rashad, take up on that – because the message has been resonated since the Bush administration, now continuing into the Obama administration, that this is not a war against Islam. And yet you go into any quarters amongst – basically anywhere – that you still hear the chief concern that the U.S. is at war against us, they're against our people. What's the counter? Is there a different message that resonates in your experience? Are there different messages that you're telling them to emphasize the point that this is not a war against Islam?

MR. HUSSAIN: Well, I think that conversation began on Inauguration Day when the president reached out to Muslim communities around the world. It continued in Ankara when the president clearly stated that the United States is not at war and will never be at war with Islamic Muslims.

It continued in Cairo, where the president highlighted the contributions of American Muslims, highlighted the importance of critical contributions that Muslims have made all around the world, made very clear that from an ideological perspective that Islam actually rejects violent extremism and is not the problem but is actually a part of promoting a peaceful solution.

And then to go through many of those conflicts that have often been a source of tension between the United States and the Muslim world and saying very clearly, here is what we're doing to transfer power back in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Here is what we're doing to try to solve the Middle East conflict, whether that's appointing Senator Mitchell on his second day in office or pushing forward with these proximity talks that we're hopeful will lead towards direct negotiations and a two-state solution. And really going through each one of those issues.

And in addition to that, while we realize that some of those things will take time to be implemented and those changes to be made on the political conflicts, but having a long-term strategic vision that we've talked about, by which we create partnerships in education and entrepreneurship and health and science and technology, interfaith dialogue and other areas.

And then on an everyday basis as Pradeep mentioned with Americans, including American Muslims, working on the ground every day in these countries. I think that as a result of those actions and even some actions in the Bush administration that we are starting to see that that narrative exists less and less amongst Muslims around the world.

MR. SHAKIR: Any other questions from the – lots, all right, great. Let's start here and work our way –

(Off-side conversation.)

Q: I'm from the National Security Journalism Initiative. Josh Meyer. I was at the L.A. Times for 20 years. I wrote about terrorism. Part of the answer I think to my question is the fact that you two gentlemen are sitting up here, but I wanted to sort of ask you about President

Obama's comments, I think it was last night or this morning, that he made in response to the Uganda bombing, in which he said, you know, he basically spoke to the people of Africa.

And he said, what you've seen in some of the statements that have been made by these terrorist organizations is that they do not regard African life as valuable in and of itself. And that seems to me like he is sort of becoming a little bit more vocal about this kind of thing. Is there some sort of overall effort underway now to really take this head on by people like you and the president, even more so than (in Cairo ?)?

MR. RAMAMURTHY: Well, I mean –

MR. SHAKIR: Maybe you'll repeat the question for people that didn't hear it.

MR. RAMAMURTHY: Yeah, the question Josh is asking is whether there's, given that the president spoke on this yesterday regarding the bombings in Uganda, whether there's now more a concerted effort.

I mean, I'd say two things about this. One is, we've been focused on this threat since day one. You know, as I mentioned earlier, this is one of the first conversations that I had with John Brennan on the day after inauguration. And I think what you've seen is consistent attempts to make it clear what we see as a giant disconnect between what they claim to be doing and what they're actually doing, contrasting that with what we're trying to do, which is to work in partnership to build a positive vision.

And I think when you see something like the attacks in Uganda, which are so cynical in the sense that they're happening at the same time that the world's eyes are on Africa for a very positive event, an event, frankly, that brings people together, granted in the spirit of competition, but friendly competition. It brings communities from around the world together.

It also happens to be the year when I think about 17 African countries are celebrating their 50<sup>th</sup> year of independence. And so it's just – it's hard not to say something when you see something that cynical and that obvious in terms of the contrasting vision that they've got for the future of that part of the world and the one that the people in that part of the world clearly want.

MR. HUSSAIN: And this is a message that's been reiterated from the beginning of the administration. As Pradeep mentioned, the president has always said that the future belongs to those who build and not those who destroy. And he was clear about that in Cairo and Ankara. And then also remember after the attempted attack on December 25<sup>th</sup>, the attack at Fort Hood and then, again, the attempted attack in Times Square when he spoke at West Point.

MR. SHAKIR: Josh, I think the answer to your question is, yes, there's a concerted effort. (Laughter.) Let's go back here.

(Off-side conversation.)

Q: I'm Mark – (inaudible) – about leveraging the whole of government to attack the problem of domestic terrorism. As you know, we have national intelligence strategy, we have national homeland security strategy, we even have a national strategy for combating terrorist travel.

The question is, do we have a strategy or are you contemplating developing a strategy for combating radicalization or violent extremism within the United States, which would then sort of outline what all the different agencies are required to do and also outline the role that engagement – which you've talked quite a bit about this morning – the role that engagement plays with all of the other activities that the U.S. government is involved in countering domestic terrorism?

MR. RAMAMURTHY: I mean, I think the first point on this is that President Obama's national security strategy, from about, you know, now, a month ago to clearly articulated radicalization as a threat that we need to pay attention to domestically.

And you know, in terms of the whole-of-government effort, I think that part of this is, we need to – we are, I think, working diligently to increase our understanding of the problem, to better connect the federal departments and agencies, not just in the law enforcement and security community, but perhaps outside of those – you know, the social service community, et cetera – to make sure that where there are complementary programs and where, kind of, information-sharing is useful and helpful, that, that's occurring.

I think we're strengthening cooperation with state and local government, including, I think, again, it's worth emphasizing, not just state and local law enforcement, but also state and local political leadership, which I think Chief Bratton would be – could talk more about. But we are also looking at the kind of work that we've done on gang programs – you know, comprehensive gang-prevention efforts that bring to force, kind of, community-engagement strategies with, kind of, both law enforcement and social services. And we're also looking at how we increase training for both federal and state and local law enforcement on these issues.

On the specific question of, kind of, written strategy, I think it's something that requires a little bit more discussion, mainly because I think there's two aspects to it. One is that, you know, I think this is – it has to be clear that this is a part of our engagement with the American Muslim community. You know, Muslim Americans are Americans first and foremost.

And so, you know, the issue is, I think, it could bring coherence; at the same time, it would have to be done in a way that makes it clear that we recognize that the American government's engagement with Muslim communities is not defined by this threat. It is a aspect of our overall engagement, which is far more comprehensive.

MR. SHAKIR: Other questions?

Q: Yes, your strategy here is different, very much, from the strategy of the German populations – tens of millions in World War I and World War II. And the only Germans who fought against the United States were very quickly shot after they got off their u-boat. You're

talking about reaching out to Muslim organizations, intermediaries, nonprofits of whom you may not know much, and whose interests may run contrary to the public's. So in that sense, why do you think your strategy of outreach to organizations, and then to the community, is better than assimilation?

And a question for the ambassador, if I could. You have talked about promoting some sort of rules that would curb blasphemy and defamation of religion, via the OIC. To what extent are you endorsing some restrictions on freedom of speech regarding Islam, either in Europe, overseas, and would those restrictions on religion – criticism of religion – apply to Islamic critics of Western religions?

MR. RAMAMURTHY: I can go first and then you go second.

MR. HUSSAIN: Sure, I can take the second question.

MR. RAMAMURTHY: Yeah, let me just – the first question is – I mean, look, people that have actual – we are pursuing. You know, those individuals that are actually picking up arms and coming against us, whether it's here or abroad, we're obviously seeking to bring them to justice. So that's – I mean, I don't necessarily see the, kind of, difference in that approach.

MR. HUSSAIN: Well, I'll – let me just say that we reject, unequivocally, restrictions on freedom of speech as a part of our efforts to move forward with a resolution that would promote freedom of religion. From our experience, efforts to restrict speech are counterproductive for a couple of reasons.

First, legal restrictions like that merely increase the profile of the speech. And if you look at the examples of the Danish cartoons or the Satanic Verses, when governments try to go in and restrict that type of speech, it just made that speech more prominent and made those messages much more widespread and accessible. And so we don't think that, that's effective as a policy matter.

Second of all is, when governments try to implement those types of restrictions and are unable to do so – and there's a recent example of this in Pakistan, where they had stopped Facebook for a while. And that type of speech will just migrate to other sites. And you know, it migrated to YouTube in that case. And that's just an example of how it's ineffective.

So our message is that, while we don't agree with speech that is hateful and we think that, that's counterproductive, that a type of legal restriction to stop that speech won't be effective and we should instead focus more on promoting freedom of religion and ensuring that, like in the United States, we have free practice of religion. And that's coupled with a restriction on, you know, any establishment of religion in the First Amendment.

MR. RAMAMURTHY: And just a broader point: Obviously, the United States is a supporter of freedom of expression not just in the United States, but actually, worldwide.

MR. SHAKIR: Let's go right here.

Q: Just a question for Chief Bratton. Your compadre, Sheriff Baca, was on the Hill a couple of weeks ago speaking about what you were talking about – this long history that Los Angeles has had in outreach to various communities. And I was very surprised to see a congressman, who shall remain nameless, kind of went ballistic about this and accused the sheriff of being – of supporting terrorism. But my question for you is, I mean, things that we have taken for granted in Los Angeles – how well-embraced are they by police departments around the country – this idea about community outreach, specifically with the Islamic community, with the Muslim community in America?

MR. BRATTON: I think I could speak with some intimacy to that. In my capacity of Los Angeles, I was also president of the Major Cities Chiefs Organization; I was president of the Police Executive Research Forum. American policing is probably much more progressive, particularly in major communities, than America as a whole.

And so whether it's the issue of immigration – most American police chiefs are adamantly opposed to the Arizona types of initiatives because we understand that, in dealing with that growing population and the crime problems that population has, in terms of both being victimized, as well as having some of those that are doing the victimization, we need to have trust.

We need to be able to work with them. We have really made great inroads in improving relationships with the African-American community, yet, for 100 years, we were part of the terrorization of that community. Similarly with this community – and this is what Baca was talking about – that it might not be popular among some groups – some of the right-wing radicals – that we are trying to reach out to a community that is really not widely understood in America – the Muslim community.

I don't profess to have an understanding of the 80 different components or groups that make up that religion, but I'm trying to. And American policing, as recently as yesterday, the intelligence commanders for most of the major-city chiefs of police have been here for the last several days meeting with Homeland Security, trying to promulgate ways in which we can continue to reach out to those communities that are attempting to be radicalized by many.

And fortunately, that community is aggressively resisting that, in many instances. And so it's a journey, but we have a lot we can learn from our involvement in dealing with gangs, our involvement in dealing with our Latino and African-American populations, and I remain optimistic on this issue. I remain very optimistic, as I think many of my colleagues in American policing do.

Q: This question is for Mr. Bratton and Ms. Roumani. To what extent do you guys see, if any, a sort of reaction among the youth in Muslim communities similar to the sort of distrust of police that exists in Latino and black communities? I mean, has that started to occur? What stage is it at, if it has?

MR. BRATTON: (Inaudible) – a thought from an experience in Los Angeles. We knew very little about the Muslim community – any aspect of it – in Los Angeles, because they're an extraordinarily law-abiding community, in terms of, particularly, what we're dealing with, unfortunately, with the gang situation in Los Angeles. So that Muslim youth community – the interaction between police and that community, I think, was a minimum because, by and large, there was not much need for police to be interacting, from a crime-control standpoint.

The interaction we are trying to create is to – and sort of, the big head-start, in that I don't think there is an alienation among the youth population – the Muslim population – that we experienced with – and justifiably – with the African-American or Latino populations. We have a big head-start with that Muslim community.

MS. ROUMANI: I would agree. I think the challenge is, within the community, is a lack of understanding of the nuance and the different parts of law enforcement and government – so understanding the difference between local law enforcement to FBI to DHS to – you know, for a lot of the community, that's just government, or that's just law enforcement. And so I think it's – there has been a general, problematic engagement with certain elements of that gamut of organizations.

And so I think that permeates down to, who do we engage with? And oftentimes, especially on this issue, there will be one strategy that's been taken by local law enforcement and a different strategy taken by FBI and a different strategy taken by DHS. And then the community's confused as to which – who to engage to and how these are all connecting. And so I think that – it's a layer of complexity that needs to be addressed, and in terms of coordination, that Pradeep talked about, as well as almost a clearinghouse of who to go to when.

And I know that's oversimplified, but for the community's sake, I think it needs to be understood of, kind of, where do we go when we have a grievance on X, Y or Z? And I know some of these issues, there's obviously – different cities have different engagements. And I think it also goes to the different elements of the community – whether it's the African-American community. Might have had, you know, certain engagement with the police versus the professional, you know, South Asian community in one community. So there's not one narrative that's working across that angle.

MR. SCHANZER: What we found in our research is, you know, really, the problem with the FBI is, while they're trying to do good outreach and build relations, just the monitoring, the informant issue really has penetrated, I think, fairly deeply into the community. And outreach – you know, the chief is talked about with the local law enforcement is really going to be much, much more effective. And that's where it has to be built. But I agree with you that the distinctions between those things get very blurred.

And that's one of the reasons why the engagement has to be not really just with the law enforcement. That's the tip of the spear in this issue. But you know, public health, education, building roads, you know – those types of things are what's going to, you know, build a greater, kind of, fabric between the community and the government that can lead to the kinds of information exchanges that we're really, you know, hoping for in the long run.

MR. SHAKIR: Other questions? Right in front.

Q: Yeah. My name is Stan Boyd, a retired history teacher. And I understand that Wahhabism has been making real inroads recently in the United States and there's a lot of funding from Saudi Arabia that's going to different universities and other places. And I want to ask Rashad, is it true – or what position does Wahhabism take on rejecting violence? You said that Muslim leaders reject it; do the Wahhabis reject it? And could you expand on that a little bit, please?

MR. HUSSAIN: The important point here is that what we've seen from the leaders that have spoken out on this issue, qualified Muslim scholars with the requisite training in the Islamic sciences that I spoke about, have rejected it unequivocally. And that has been, from my experience across many of the different schools of thought – you know, the Hanafi school or the Maliki (sp) school or the other schools within Islam – the Sunni schools and the Shia schools. And I think that the condemnation has been widespread, and not only amongst schools of thought, but also geographically, as well.

And so, while I can't vouch for the fact that there's been a fatwa that's been representative of every single one of those schools, I do know that it's widespread, and certainly, our message will continue to be the same and the message of Muslim communities will continue to be the same. And this is something that those who have studied the religion in a manner which qualifies them to speak on this issue will continue to reject it.

Q: And that is true of the Wahhabis?

MR. HUSSAIN: Yeah. That's – I mean, I don't want to go into every single specific sect, because now that you mention it, there are so many that exist, but I think that the message is clear.

MR. SHAKIR: Back there.

Q: I'm an attorney that works with Islamic charities. I want to ask to what extent U.S. policies and associations strengthen the narrative that the U.S. is hostile to Islam. And let me give you just two examples.

One is policies toward charities, which have been condemned – U.S. policies – as lacking due process and transparency and have been enforced more against Muslim charities than against others. The New York Times reported this week that U.S. charities that support illegal settlers are given tax exemptions. And Muslim charities have been shut down throughout the world.

And this is seen, especially in light of Secretary Clinton's speech in Poland calling on other countries to respect civil societies, as somewhat hypocritical. An example of association would be the use of the video "Obsession," which was very hostile to Islam, in training U.S. Defense Department officials.

MR. SHAKIR: Who wants to take it?

MR. RAMAMURTHY: Let me say two things about this. The first is that I firmly believe that people that are terrorists, you know, are using these grievances. I mean, I don't believe for a second that they're suddenly going to stop doing things because there's some certain specific changes in certain policies that they point to as the reason or justification for their action. I think they're intent on violence and are just going to carry out violence.

The second thing – on this specific issue with charities – you know, the Treasury Department has been doing a fairly robust set of engagement with the American Muslim community specifically on this issue of charitable giving and specifically on the issue of the obligation of zakat. And you know, I think that's something that I would defer to the Treasury Department to talk more about, but that's a strong level of engagement that's happened.

The other point I would make about this is, in terms of, you know, the rules about terrorist financing, that's what they are. They're rules about terrorist financing. And these have not just been enforced on, you know, certain religious charities, et cetera. They are related to designated terrorist actors. So whether that's charity that's assisting those are religious in nature or not is not the issue; the issue is where the money is ending up, and whether it's on a designated list. But I'd kind of defer more questions – I don't know if, Rashad, you want to talk about this – or additional questions to Treasury.

The other point I'd make is I do think – and I strongly continue to believe – that there – and it echoes, kind of, a point Nadia made – that there's a lack of full understanding about what all the rules are, you know. And that is something that I think the Treasury Department is really working hard to fix.

In fact, I asked them, for example, to talk about this in a way – I'm not a lawyer – so talk to me, like, in non-lawyer terms about the rules about terrorist giving, about how folks can ensure that their money is not ending up in those places. Because obviously, the end goal here is the same for both of us. We want to make sure that, that money is getting to where it's intended to get to, which is to help people and not to enrich terrorists.

MS. ROUMANI: I really appreciate that question because a lot of times the question that is asked is, you know, where is the Muslim-led engagement on some of these issues, or even on – the challenge with a lot of it has been both Muslim charities being able to contribute and support its own communities here in the U.S., as well as foundations that are trying to support, also, what are considered, like AMEMSA communities – Arab, Middle Eastern, South Asian and Muslim.

Because one is that there is an extra layer of scrutiny and, two, there's an increased perceived level of scrutiny that's deterring other people from contributing because it's seen as being, kind of, too risky or too challenging to engage in this kind of work. And so what that means is a smaller influx of resources going to organizations that are trying to do the very work that people are being asked to do.

And so in a way, it's kind of – your hands are tied because you don't have the mechanisms. And so one of the biggest challenges is to better understand what that scrutiny is, to better understand what does it mean when it says "material support." I know with the Supreme Court ruling, et cetera, it's kind of like, well, organizations, to err on the side of being cautious, will then just not engage.

And that's just putting these organizations in even further difficulty, because most of them are also very new – especially the community-based organizations – are very young, have human-capacity deficits, have financial-capacity deficits. And if we're cutting off a pipeline of resources to help build the capacity, then the question is, where is that expected to come from? It doesn't just kind of, you know, fall out of midair.

MR. SHAKIR: We're running out of time, but this gentlelady has had her hand up for a while so we'll give you a shot in here.

Q: (Inaudible) – of the Charity and Security Network. I guess my question is, how can the U.S. nonprofit sector, both Muslim charities, grant-making foundations, international NGOs have experienced severe difficulties in humanitarian aid because of some of the overly detailed, overly strict, unnecessary barriers of national security policy. And there is substantive disagreement with Treasury.

It's not a matter that we're not intelligent enough to understand what the rules are. How can we get a breakthrough and get to the substance of what the problems are and seek solutions to what we all share as common goals here and kind of get past this mythology that the charitable sector is not smart enough to understand what the problem is and Treasury just needs to keep explaining it to us. They've been explaining it to us for eight, nine years and we get it. We just don't agree. We need to address the substance.

(Off-side conversation.)

MR. RAMAMURTHY: So, you know, I think there's two aspects to this. One is, I should clarify that in terms of explaining the rules better, I'm primarily thinking about reaching the general public, and not necessarily the charitable sector specifically, which obviously does have a very sophisticated understanding.

On the second thing – the second point – is I think we're very committed to, kind of, understanding what the substantive disagreements are and of figuring out and continuing to have a dialogue on this. At the same time, we obviously have a strong belief and, I think, a shared interest in making sure that this money does not end up where it doesn't belong.

So you know, I know that's a shared interest and that's a first premise of a conversation. I also know that Treasury has been, kind of, working on this issue iteratively with community leaders, both in the Muslim community, but the broader charitable sector. But it's kind of a more focused Treasury issue, in terms of the actual question of terrorist financing.

MR. SHAKIR: Closing thoughts from any of our panelists on the issue of countering radical extremism?

MR. RAMAMURTHY: I'll offer just one thought. I mean, I actually really appreciate this forum. I would echo what Congressman Ellison said about supporting a more robust, more nuanced, more rich national conversation on this issue, which I think is something that we're going to be dealing with for a while and is an issue, certainly, that we're paying an intense amount of attention to and see the potential for a great degree of, kind of, national cooperation to address it. So I want to thank CAP and NSN for hosting the event, but I also hope that it's the first of many.

MR. SHAKIR: All right. With that, thank you all for joining us –

(END)