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February 25, 2005
Yesterday's agreement between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin to increase and hasten joint efforts to reduce dangers posed by Russian nuclear weapons and materials was a positive step forward. Steps to upgrade security at Russian nuclear facilities and increase emergency response cooperation on nuclear incidents are critical. But more must be done—and faster—to prevent terrorists from getting their hands on nuclear weapons and other dangerous materials.
- President Bush must make up for time lost during his first term on efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. As Matthew Bunn of Harvard recently concluded, fewer weapons-grade materials were secured in the two years after 9/11 than in the two years that followed the terrorist attacks. Today, only 22 percent of Russia's massive stockpile of weapons-grade, military-origin materials has received comprehensive security upgrades. Yesterday's agreement by the two leaders on the importance of speeding this work up is welcome, but they failed to clear much of the underbrush that snagged progress during Bush's first term. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether their pronouncements will actually result in the accelerated pace of progress that is essential in this age of terrorism.
- Bush and Putin did almost nothing to stop the spread of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. The most worrisome weapons in Russia's arsenal are its tactical nuclear weapons, estimated at 3,000-20,000 in number. This range is indicative of how little we know about these small, portable and easy to conceal nuclear weapons that are especially attractive to terrorists. Unlike Russia's strategic nuclear weapons arsenal, which the United States is helping Russia to safely and securely dismantle, tactical nuclear weapons remain outside these programs. Unfortunately, Bush and Putin's agreement yesterday did little to secure these weapons.
- The White House continues to pursue the wrong priorities on nuclear security. While the Bush administration has spent billions rushing to deploy a national missile defense system that does not work against a threat that does not currently exist, it has virtually ignored the route most likely to be used in a nuclear attack: smuggling the weapon or its key components (such as weapons-grade materials) into the United States. Even more disconcerting, the administration is researching new nuclear weapons concepts 15 years after the end of the Cold War, eroding America's capacity to strengthen needed cooperation on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to Iran, North Korea, and possibly others.
Daily Talking Points is a product of the American Progress Action Fund. |
Daily Talking Points is a product of the American Progress Action Fund. |
